DEEP FAKE GENERATION AND DETECTION

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GREYC Lab



Research in Digital Sciences

Image processing, artificial intelligence, data science, instrumentation, theoretical computer science, cybersecurity, natural language processing ...

► In Normandy, France



SAFE Team Members Security, Architecture, Forensics, biomEtrics

GREYC Electronics and Computer Science Laboratory

- ► Faculty staff
 - 3 full PR
 - 5 associate PR (4 HdR)
 - 1 CNRS researcher (HdR)
 - 2 research ing.
- ► Team members
 - 8 PhD students
 - 7 associated researchers
 - 1 associated PR under contract (PAST)





Research activities



Biometrics

o Biometric systems design

• New biometric systems

• Evaluation of biometric systems

- Quality of biometrics data.
- Presentation attacks detection

• Biometrics data protection

 non-invertible transformation schemes



Security Architectures and models

- Security of future SDN/5G/6G network technologies
 - IoT
 - Junction of Physical and Cyber wolrds.
- Detection of attacks and associated countermeasures

• Boolean functions for security

• correcting codes, Boolean functions, steganography.



Forensics

• Automatic language processing

- analysis of digital text traces
- automatic extraction of information

• Analysis of digital traces

- linking digital identity and the real identity of individuals
- analysis of societal interactions in the cyberspace
- Deepfake, images/video forgery

• Personal data protection

• Privacy protection.



- 1. What is a deepfake?
- 2. How is generated a deepfake?
 - Strategy 1: Autoencoder
 - Strategy 2: GAN
- 3. Deepfake misuse
- 4. Deepfake detection
- 5. Future trends







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WHAT IS A DEEPFAKE?







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Alert message from the health authorities



https://login.deepword.co/user/dashboard

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2022 Finse Cyber Security Winter School, 24 – 29 April

Have you ever

- Come across quite strange tiktok videos with celebrities?
 - Tom cruise

- seen a person imitate different celebrities?
 - Eg. Robin Williams impersonating Jack Nicholson







• noticed something strange in a person's voice or face?

- Deepfakes are synthetic media in which a person in an existing video or image is replaced by someone else likeness.
- While the act of faking content is not new, deepfakes led in powerful techniques from machine learning and articifial intelligence to manipulate video and audio content with a high potential to deceive.
- Example : Obama's pubic service annoucement





- ► Many app exist to create deepfake
- ► Among them, we can cite
 - Reface app (voice, face swap)

- FaceApp
- Zao
- SpeakPic
- DeepFaceLab
- FakeApp
- Reflect
- Deepfake Web











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HOW IS GENERATED A DEEPFAKE?









The main machine learning methods used to create deepfakes are based on deep learning approaches and involve training Generative Neural Network (GNN) architectures, such as **autoencoder** or **Generative Adversarial Networks** (GAN).





Hierarchical representations

"Deep learning methods aim at learning feature hierarchies with features from higher levels of the hierarchy formed by the composition of lower level features.

Automatically learning features at multiple levels of abstraction allows a system to learn **complex functions** mapping the input to the output directly from data, without depending completely on human-crafted features."

— Yoshua Bengio

Deep learning architecture



[Bengio, "On the expressive power of deep architectures", *Talk at ALT*, 2011] [Bengio, *Learning Deep Architectures for AI*, 2009]



Sparse and/or distributed representations

Biological motivation: V1 visual cortex



Example on MNIST handwritten digits An image of size 28x28 pixels can be represented using a small combination of **codes** from a **basis set**.

[Ranzato, Poultney, Chopra & LeCun, "Efficient Learning of Sparse Representations with an Energy-Based Model ", NIPS, 2006; Ranzato, Boureau & LeCun, "Sparse Feature Learning for Deep Belief Networks", NIPS, 2007]



- ► To date, always supervised
- ► Need at lot of labeled data
- ► What to do if huge amount of unlabeled data?
- Supervised learning towards unsupervised learning

"We expect unsupervised learning to become far more important in the longer term. Human and animal learning is largely unsupervised: we discover the structure of the world by observing it, not by being told the name of every object." - LeCun, Bengio and Hinton

LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y. & Hinton, G. Deep learning. Nature 521, 436-444 (2015)



Data: X (no labels!)

► Goal: Learn the structure of the data (learn correlations between features)





Examples: Clustering, Compression, Feature & Representation learning, Dimensionality reduction, Generative models, etc.



PCA – Principal Component analysis

Statistical approach for data compression and visualization
Invented by Karl Pearson in 1901

► Weakness:

• linear components only.









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HOW IS GENERATED A DEEPFAKE?

Strategy 1: the autoencoders



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Traditional Autoencoder







Traditional Autoencoder

Unlike the PCA now we can use activation functions to achieve non-linearity.

► It has been shown that an AE without activation functions achieves the PCA capacity.





- ► The autoencoder idea was a part of NN history for decades (LeCun et al, 1987).
- Traditionally an autoencoder is used for dimensionality reduction and feature learning.

Recently, the connection between autoencoders and latent space modeling has brought autoencoders to the front of generative modeling.

Not used for compression.
-Data specific compression.
-Lossy.

Simple Idea







Learning the identity function seems trivial, but with added constraints on the network (such as limiting the number of hidden neurons or regularization) we can learn information about the structure of the data.

Trying to capture the distribution of the data (data specific!)



- ► Using **Gradient Descent** we can simply train the model as any other FC NN with:
 - Traditionally with squared error loss function

$$L(x, \hat{x}) = ||x - \hat{x}||^2$$

• If our input is interpreted as bit vectors or vectors of bit probabilities the cross entropy can be used

$$H(p,q) = -\sum_{x} p(x) \log q(x)$$



► We distinguish between two types of AE structures:





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Undercomplete AE

- Hidden layer is Undercomplete if smaller than the input layer
 - Compresses the input
 - Compresses well only for the training dist.
- ► Hidden nodes will be
 - Good features for the training distribution.
 - Bad for other types on input





► A higher dimension code helps model a more complex distribution.

Hidden layer is Overcomplete if greater than the input layer • No compression in hidden layer. • Each hidden unit could copy a different input component

Adding dimensions is good for training a linear classifier (XOR case

No guarantee that the hidden units will extract meaningful structure

- example).

 χ

 \hat{x}

f(x)



W

W

Overcomplete AE

Simple latent space interpolation







Simple latent space interpolation







Simple latent space interpolation





Convolutional AE







Convolutional AE



Convolutional AE – Keras example results



- 50 epochs.
- 88% accuracy on validation set.



Regularization



► Motivations

- We would like to learn meaningful features **without** altering the code's dimensions (Overcomplete or Undercomplete)
- We would like to avoid uninteresting solutions

► The solution: **imposing other constraints on the network**.



Activation Maps

A bad example:




► We want our learned features to be as sparse as possible.

► With sparse features we can generalize better.





Sparsely Regulated Autoencoders

► Recall:

- $a_j^{(Bn)}$ is defined to be the activation of the *j*th hidden unit (bottleneck) of the autoencoder.
- Let $a_i^{(Bn)}(x)$ be the activation of this specific node on a given input x.
- Let

$$\hat{\rho}_j = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \left[a_j^{(Bn)} \left(x^{(i)} \right) \right]$$

be the average activation hidden unit *j* (over the training)

► We would like to force the constraint

$$\hat{\rho}_j = \rho$$

where ρ is a "sparsity parameter", typically small.

▶ In other words, we want the average activation of each neuron j to be close to ρ .



- We need to penalize $\hat{\rho}_i$ for deviating from ρ .
- Many choices of the penalty term will give reasonable results.
- ► For example:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{Bn} KL(\rho|\hat{\rho}_j)$$

where $KL(\rho|\hat{\rho}_j)$ is a Kullback-Leibler divergence function.



Reminder

KL is a standard function for measuring how different two distributions are, which has the properties:

$$KL(\rho|\hat{\rho}_j) = 0 \text{ if } \hat{\rho}_j = \rho$$

otherwise it is increased monotonically.



 $\rho = 0.2$



► Our overall cost functions is now:

$$J_{S}(W,b) = J(W,b) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{Bn} KL(p|\hat{\rho}_{j})$$

*Note: We need to know $\hat{\rho}_j$ before hand, so we have to compute a forward pass on all the training set.



Intuition:

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- ► We still aim to encode the input and to NOT mimic the identity function.
- We try to undo the effect of corruption process stochastically applied to the input.

A more robust model



Use Case:

► Extract robust representation for a NN classifier.





Instead of trying to mimic the identity function by minimizing: L(x, g(f(x)))

where L is some loss function

A **DAE** instead minimizes:

 $L(x,g(f(\tilde{x})))$

where \tilde{x} is a copy of x that has been corrupted by some form of noise.

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Denoising Autoencoders

Idea: A robust representation against noise

► Random assignment of subset of inputs to 0, with probability v. ► Gaussian additive noise.



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Denoising Autoencoders

- Reconstruction \hat{x} computed from the corrupted input \tilde{x} .
- Loss function compares \hat{x} reconstruction with the noiseless x.
- The autoencoder cannot fully trust each feature of x independently so it must learn the correlations of x's features.
- > Based on those relations we can predict a more 'not prune to changes' model.

We are forcing the hidden layer to learn a generalized structure of the data.







Taken some input *x* Apply Noise











Denoising Autoencoders - process





Denoising Autoencoders - process



Denoising Autoencoders - process





Denoising autoencoders







- 50 epochs.
- Noise factor 0.5
- 92% accuracy on validation set.





Stacked AE

Motivations

- ► We want to harness the feature extraction quality of a AE for our advantage.
- ► *For example:* we can build a deep supervised classifier where it's input is the output of a SAE.
- ► The benefit: our deep model's W are not randomly initialized but are rather "smartly selected"
- Also using this unsupervised technique lets us have a larger unlabeled dataset.



Building a SAE consists of two phases:

- 1. Train each AE layer one after the other.
- 2. Connect any classifier (SVM / FC NN layer etc.)

Stacked AE





First Layer Training (AE 1)





Second Layer Training (AE 2)





Add any classifier





Contractive autoencoders

- •We are still trying to avoid uninteresting features.
- Here we add a regularization term $\Omega(x)$ to our loss function to limit the hidden layer.





Contractive autoencoders

Idea: We wish to extract features that only reflect variations observed in the training set. We would like to be invariant to the other variations.

Points close to each other in the input space maintain that property in the latent space.





Definitions and reminders:

• Frobenius norm (L2):
$$||A||_F = \sqrt{\Sigma_{i,j} |a_{ij}|^2}$$

• Jacobian Matrix:
$$J_f(x) = \frac{\partial f(x)}{\partial x} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f(x)_1}{\partial x_1} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f(x)_1}{\partial x_n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f(x)_m}{\partial x_1} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f(x)m}{\partial x_n} \end{bmatrix}$$

•Our new loss function would be:

$$L^*(x) = L(x) + \lambda \Omega(x)$$

where
$$\Omega(x) = \|J_f(x)\|_F^2$$
 or simply: $\sum_{i,j} \left(\frac{\partial f(x)_j}{\partial x_i}\right)^2$

and where λ controls the balance of our reconstruction objective and the hidden layer "flatness".



• Our new loss function would be: $L^*(x) = L(x) + \lambda \Omega(x)$

- L(x) would be an encoder that keeps good information ($\lambda \rightarrow 0$)
- $\Omega(x)$ would be an encoder that throws away all information $(\lambda \to \infty)$

Combination would be an encoder that keeps **only** good information.

Contractive autoencoders







- DAE make the **reconstruction function** resist small, finite sized perturbations in input.
- ► CAE make the **feature encoding function** resist small, infinitesimal perturbations in input.

► Both denoising AE and contractive AE perform well!

Advantage of DAE: simpler to implement

- Requires adding one or two lines of code to regular AE.
- No need to compute Jacobian of hidden layer.
- Advantage of CAE: gradient is deterministic.
 - might be more stable than DAE, which uses a sampled gradient.
 - one less hyper-parameter to tune (noise-factor)







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HOW IS GENERATED A DEEPFAKE?

Strategy 2: GAN













► Generative

• Learn a generative model

► Adversarial

• Trained in an adversarial setting

► Networks

• Use Deep Neural Networks



Why Generative models?

Discriminative models

- Given an image **X**, predict a label **Y**
- Estimates P(Y|X)
- Discriminative models have several key limitations
 - Can't model **P(X)**, *i.e.* the probability of seeing a certain image **X**
 - Thus, can't sample from **P(X)**, *i.e.* can't generate new images
- Generative models (in general) cope with all of above
 - Can model **P(X)**
 - Can generate new images







Lotter, William, Gabriel Kreiman, and David Cox. "Unsupervised learning of visual structure using predictive generative networks." arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.06380 (2015).



Magic of GANs

► Which one is computer generated?



url : <u>www.whichfaceisreal.com</u> (2019)



Magic of GANs

► Which one is computer generated?



url : <u>www.whichfaceisreal.com</u> (2019)
Magic of GANs





http://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~junyanz/projects/gvm/



Adversarial training

▶ Remarks

- We can generate adversarial samples to fool a discriminative model
- We can use those adversarial samples to make models robust
- We then require more effort to generate adversarial samples
- Repeat this and we get better discriminative model

►GANs extend that idea to generative models

- Generator: generate fake samples, tries to fool the Discriminator
- Discriminator: tries to distinguish between real and fake samples
- Train them against each other
- Repeat this and we get better Generator and Discriminator



GAN's Architecture



► Z is some random noise (Gaussian/Uniform).

► Z can be thought as the latent representation of the image.



Generator in action

►GAN learning to generate images (linear time)



- **Generator network**: try to fool the discriminator by generating real-looking images
- **Discriminator network**: try to distinguish between real and fake images



- **Generator network**: try to fool the discriminator by generating real-looking images
- **Discriminator network**: try to distinguish between real and fake images
- ► Train jointly in minimax game
- Minimax objective function

$$\min_{\theta_g} \max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$$

- **Generator network**: try to fool the discriminator by generating real-looking images
- **Discriminator network**: try to distinguish between real and fake images
- ► Train jointly in **minimax game**
- Minimax objective function

Discriminator outputs likelihood in (0,1) of real image

$$\min_{\theta_g} \max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$$

Discriminator output for real data x

Discriminator output for generated fake data G(z)

- Discriminator (θ_d) wants to **maximize objective** such that D(x) is close to 1 (real) and D(G(z)) is close to 0 (fake)
- Generator (θ_g) wants to **minimize objective** such that D(G(z)) is close to 1 (discriminator is fooled into thinking generated G(z) is real)



Gradient signal

dominated by region

Minimax objective function:

$$\min_{\theta_g} \max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$$

Alternate between

1. Gradient ascent on discriminator

 $\max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$

2. Gradient descent on generator

$$\min_{\theta_g} \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z)))$$

In practice, optimizing this generator objective does not work well!



Minimax objective function:

 $\min_{\theta_g} \max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$

► Alternate between

1. Gradient ascent on discriminator

 $\max_{\theta_d} \left[\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D_{\theta_d}(x) + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(1 - D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z))) \right]$

2. Instead: Gradient ascent on generator, different objective

 $\max_{\theta_g} \mathbb{E}_{z \sim p(z)} \log(D_{\theta_d}(G_{\theta_g}(z)))$

Instead of minimizing likelihood of discriminator being correct, now maximize likelihood of discriminator being wrong. Same objective of fooling discriminator, but now higher gradient signal for bad samples => works much better! Standard in practice. Aside: Jointly training two networks is challenging, can be unstable. Choosing objectives with better loss landscapes helps training, is an active area of research.





- **Generator network**: try to fool the discriminator by generating real-looking images
- **Discriminator network**: try to distinguish between real and fake images



Generative Adversarial Nets



Generated samples



Figures copyright lan Goodfellow et al., 2014. Reproduced with permission.

Generator is an upsampling network with fractionally-strided convolutions
 Discriminator is a convolutional network

Architecture guidelines for stable Deep Convolutional GANs

- Replace any pooling layers with strided convolutions (discriminator) and fractional-strided convolutions (generator).
- Use batchnorm in both the generator and the discriminator.
- Remove fully connected hidden layers for deeper architectures.
- Use ReLU activation in generator for all layers except for the output, which uses Tanh.
- Use LeakyReLU activation in the discriminator for all layers.

Radford et al, "Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks", ICLR 2016



Generative Adversarial Nets: Convolutional Architectures



Radford et al, "Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks", ICLR 2016

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Generative Adversarial Nets: Convolutional Architectures Some results



 Trained on LSUN bedroom dataset, 3 millions of images

Samples from the model look much better!



Radford et al, "Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks", ICLR 2016

Generative Adversarial Nets: Convolutional Architectures Some results



- Allows to evaluate if the network has overlearned
- Interpolating between random points in latent (Z)



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Algebra on the latent space Z



Algebra on the latent space Z





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Results over the years





The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, 2018.



Allows to define style transfer

Monet 📿 Photos











summer \rightarrow winter



winter \rightarrow summer

Zhu et al., Unpaired Image-to-Image Translation using Cycle-Consistent Adversarial Networks, ICCV 2017.

CycleGAN

Allows the network to discover large-scale structures, then refine to detail

► Faster, because it trains mostly on smaller images (2x-6x gain)



Note: fine details are usually problematic for GAN

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Pix2Pix examples



Example results on several image-to-image translation problems. In each case we use the same architecture and objective, simply training on different data.

GANs in action







winter \rightarrow summer



Photograph



Monet



Van Gogh



Cezanne

Ukiyo-e

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Image resolution





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Motivation

- ► Given a text description, generate images closely associated.
- ► Uses a conditional GAN with the generator and discriminator being condition on "dense" text embedding.

Reed, S., Akata, Z., Yan, X., Logeswaran, L., Schiele, B., & Lee, H. "Generative adversarial text to image synthesis". ICML (2016).

this small bird has a pink breast and crown, and black primaries and secondaries.



this magnificent fellow is almost all black with a red crest, and white cheek patch.



the flower has petals that are bright pinkish purple with white stigma



this white and yellow flower have thin white petals and a round yellow stamen





Text-to-image Synthesis



Positive Examples Real Image, Right Text

Negative Examples Real Image, wrong Text Fake Image, right text

Reed, S., Akata, Z., Yan, X., Logeswaran, L., Schiele, B., & Lee, H. "Generative adversarial text to image synthesis". ICML (2016).

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- Differentiating Feature: Uses an Identity Preservation Optimization using an auxiliary network to get a better approximation of the latent code (z*) for an input image.
- Latent code is then conditioned on a discrete (one-hot) embedding of age



Antipov, G., Baccouche, M., & Dugelay, J. L. (2017). "Face Aging With Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks". arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.01983.

Face Aging with conditional GANs





Antipov, G., Baccouche, M., & Dugelay, J. L. (2017). "Face Aging With Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks". arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.01983.

The GAN Zoo



- GAN Generative Adversarial Networks
- 3D-GAN Learning a Probabilistic Latent Space of Object Shapes via 3D Generative-Adversarial Modeling
- acGAN Face Aging With Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks
- AC-GAN Conditional Image Synthesis With Auxiliary Classifier GANs
- AdaGAN AdaGAN: Boosting Generative Models
- AEGAN Learning Inverse Mapping by Autoencoder based Generative Adversarial Nets
- AffGAN Amortised MAP Inference for Image Super-resolution
- AL-CGAN Learning to Generate Images of Outdoor Scenes from Attributes and Semantic Layouts
- ALI Adversarially Learned Inference
- AM-GAN Generative Adversarial Nets with Labeled Data by Activation Maximization
- AnoGAN Unsupervised Anomaly Detection with Generative Adversarial Networks to Guide Marker Discovery
- ArtGAN ArtGAN: Artwork Synthesis with Conditional Categorial GANs
- b-GAN b-GAN: Unified Framework of Generative Adversarial Networks
- Bayesian GAN Deep and Hierarchical Implicit Models
- BEGAN BEGAN: Boundary Equilibrium Generative Adversarial Networks
- BiGAN Adversarial Feature Learning
- BS-GAN Boundary-Seeking Generative Adversarial Networks
- CGAN Conditional Generative Adversarial Nets
- CaloGAN CaloGAN: Simulating 3D High Energy Particle Showers in Multi-Layer Electromagnetic Calorimeters with Generative Adversarial Networks
- CCGAN Semi-Supervised Learning with Context-Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks
- CatGAN Unsupervised and Semi-supervised Learning with Categorical Generative Adversarial Networks
- CoGAN Coupled Generative Adversarial Networks

- Context-RNN-GAN Contextual RNN-GANs for Abstract Reasoning Diagram Generation
- C-RNN-GAN C-RNN-GAN: Continuous recurrent neural networks with adversarial training
- CS-GAN Improving Neural Machine Translation with Conditional Sequence Generative Adversarial Nets
- CVAE-GAN CVAE-GAN: Fine-Grained Image Generation through Asymmetric Training
- CycleGAN Unpaired Image-to-Image Translation using Cycle-Consistent Adversarial Networks
- DTN Unsupervised Cross-Domain Image Generation
- DCGAN Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks
- DiscoGAN Learning to Discover Cross-Domain Relations with Generative Adversarial Networks
- DR-GAN Disentangled Representation Learning GAN for Pose-Invariant Face Recognition
- DualGAN DualGAN: Unsupervised Dual Learning for Image-to-Image Translation
- EBGAN Energy-based Generative Adversarial Network
- f-GAN f-GAN: Training Generative Neural Samplers using Variational Divergence Minimization
- FF-GAN Towards Large-Pose Face Frontalization in the Wild
- GAWWN Learning What and Where to Draw
- GeneGAN GeneGAN: Learning Object Transfiguration and Attribute Subspace from Unpaired Data
- Geometric GAN Geometric GAN
- GoGAN Gang of GANs: Generative Adversarial Networks with Maximum Margin Ranking
- GP-GAN GP-GAN: Towards Realistic High-Resolution Image Blending
- IAN Neural Photo Editing with Introspective Adversarial Networks
- iGAN Generative Visual Manipulation on the Natural Image Manifold
- IcGAN Invertible Conditional GANs for image editing
- ID-CGAN Image De-raining Using a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network
- Improved GAN Improved Techniques for Training GANs
- InfoGAN InfoGAN: Interpretable Representation Learning by Information Maximizing Generative Adversarial Nets
- LAGAN Learning Particle Physics by Example: Location-Aware Generative Adversarial Networks for Physics
 Synthesis
- LAPGAN Deep Generative Image Models using a Laplacian Pyramid of Adversarial Networks

https://github.com/hindupuravinash/the-gan-zoo

Also see https://paperswithcode.com/task/image-generation/latest







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DEEPFAKE MISUSE







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Deepfake misuse





Cyber crime



Privacy invasion



Social manipulation

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Deepfake misuse

►Attacks In 2017....



In 2021











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DEEPFAKE DETECTION









In 2021, Facebook has launched a project, with Michigan State University, to create the "most successful deepfake detection software available today". This technique is called reverse engineering. It consists of deconstructing the photo or video to identify imperfections added to the editing.





FaceForensics++ is a database that allows researchers to be aware of the latest advances in deepfake detection software. This dataset is based on different deepfake methods that analyze videos and try to find a clue of faking through a CNN





Video Athenticator

- In Sept. 2020, Microsoft unveiled a software that analyzes a still image or video.
- It will provide a percentage of chance the media is artificially manipulated.
- In the case of a video, it can provide this percentage in real time on all the images while the video is playing.
- It uses the FaceForensics++ database and has been tested during the DeepFake Detection Challenge with a high success rate (around 90%)



- ► If deepfake detection software rise up, they tackle at least three major difficulties:
 - The quality of the video to analyze
 Video of low quality decreases the performance of detector
 - 2. The multiplicity of deepfake methods
 - 3. The ever-increasing evolution of technology


- ► The movie industry is starting to be interested in deepfake technology for its movies, both in Hollywood and in France.
- In the french TV soap "Plus belle la vie", an episode uses deepfake to compensate for the absence of an actress.
- ► A specialist of this technology has been hired by Lucas Film for the next season of "The Mandalorian"....







FUTURE TRENDS









- Pandora's box has opened, and it looks like the competition between the creation and detection and prevention of deepfakes will become increasingly fierce in the future, with deepfake technology not only becoming easier to access, but deepfake content easier to create and progressively harder to distinguish from real.
- According to experts, GANs (generative adversarial networks) will be the main drivers of deepfakes development in the future, and these will be near-impossible to distinguish from authentic content.



- Deepfakes are not only a technical problem, and as the Pandora's box has been opened, they are not going to disappear in the foreseeable future.
- ▶ But with technical improvements in our ability to detect them, and the increased public awareness of the problem, we can learn to coexist with them and to limit their negative impacts in the future.







Contacts



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