Farzane Karami

• Karami, Farzane; Owe, Olaf & Ramezanifarkhani, Toktam (2019). Summary of: An Evaluation of Interaction Paradigms for Active Objects. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS).  ISSN 0302-9743.  11918, s 529- 533 . doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-34968-4_31 Vis sammendrag

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• Karami, Farzane; Owe, Olaf & Ramezanifarkhani, Toktam (2018). An Evaluation of Interaction Paradigms for Active Objects. Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming.  ISSN 2352-2208.  103, s 154- 183 . doi: 10.1016/j.jlamp.2018.11.008
• Ramezanifarkhani, Toktam; Karami, Farzane & Owe, Olaf (2017). A High-Level Language for Active Objects with Future-Free Support of Futures, In Marina Walden (ed.),  Proceedings of the 29th Nordic Workshop on Programming Theory.  Turku Centre for Computer Science.  ISBN 978-952-12-3608-2.  kapittel.  s 25 - 27

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• Karami, Farzane; Owe, Olaf & Schneider, Gerardo (2020). Information-Flow Control by means of Security Wrappers for Active Object Languages with Futures. In Proceedings of The 25th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems (NortdSec 2020). To appear in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (17 pages). Vis sammendrag

  This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a general concurrency language model where concurrent objects interact by asynchronous method calls and futures. The aim is to prevent leakage of secure information to low-level viewers. The approach is based on a notion of security wrappers, where a wrapper encloses an object or a component and controls its interactions with the environment. Our run-time system automatically adds a wrapper to an insecure component. The wrappers are invisible such that a wrapped component and its environment are not aware of it. The security policies of a wrapper are formalized based on a notion of security levels. At run-time, future components will be wrapped upon need, and objects of unsafe classes will be wrapped, using static checking to limit the number of unsafe classes and thereby reducing run-time overhead. We define an operational semantics and sketch a proof of noninterference. A service provider may use wrappers to protect its services in an insecure environment, and vice-versa: a system platform may use wrappers to protect itself from insecure service providers. Keywords: Active objects · Futures · Information-flow security · Noninterference · language-based security · Distributed systems

• Karami, Farzane; Owe, Olaf; Schneider, Gerardo & Johansen, Christian (2018). The Future Mechanism and Information Flow Security.
• Ramezanifarkhani, Toktam; Karami, Farzane & Owe, Olaf (2017). A High-Level Language for Active Objects with Future-Free Support of Futures.

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