

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC AND BAYESIAN BELIEF REASONING

Tutorial at FUSION 2022

4 Juli 2022

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UiO : **University of Oslo**

About me


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Research interests
 - Information Security
 - Reasoning under uncertainty
- Bio
 - Telecommunications Engineer, 1988
 - MSc Information Security, London 1993
 - PhD Information Security, NTNU 1998
 - Associate Prof. QUT, Australia, 2000
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
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Tutorial overview

1. Representations of subjective opinions



2. Operators of subjective logic




3. Bayesian belief reasoning:


- Trust fusion and transitivity
- Trust networks
- Bayesian reasoning
- Subjective networks



The General Idea of Subjective Logic



Example Correspondences

| Binary Logic | Generalization  | Probabilistic logic |
|---|---|--|
| AND: $x \wedge y$ | Product: | $p(x \wedge y) = p(x)p(y)$ |
| OR: $x \vee y$ | Coproduct: | $p(x \vee y) = 1 - (1-p(x))(1-p(y))$ |
| MP: $\{x \rightarrow y, x\} \Rightarrow y$ | Deduction: | $p(y) = p(y x)p(x) + p(y \bar{x})p(\bar{x})$ |
| Contraposition CP: $x \rightarrow y \Leftrightarrow \bar{y} \rightarrow \bar{x}$ | Bayes' theorem $p(x y) = \frac{p(y x)a(x)}{p(y x)a(x) + p(y \bar{x})a(\bar{x})}$ $p(x \bar{y}) = \frac{p(\bar{y} x)a(x)}{p(\bar{y} x)a(x) + p(\bar{y} \bar{x})a(\bar{x})}$ | |
| MT: $\{x \rightarrow y, \bar{y}\} \Rightarrow \bar{x}$ | Abduction: | $p(x) = p(x y)p(y) + p(x \bar{y})p(\bar{y})$ |

Aleatoric and Epistemic Uncertainty

Aleatoric uncertainty

- Aleatoric uncertainty results from knowledge that is conflicting or balanced
- Low aleatoric uncertainty when probability is close to $P=0$ or $P=1$
- High aleatoric uncertainty when $P= \frac{1}{2}$
- *E.g.: Probability of heads when flipping coin is $P= \frac{1}{2}$, and hence high aleatoric uncertainty, but dynamics of situation are known, hence low epistemic uncertainty.*



“alea” = “dice” in Latin

Epistemic uncertainty

- Epistemic uncertainty results from lack of knowledge
- Low epistemic uncertainty when circumstances and dynamics of the situation are known
- High epistemic uncertainty when circumstances and dynamics of the situation are unknown
- *E.g.: Probability that Oswald was the assassin of US president Kennedy in 1963 is $P= \frac{1}{2}$, but lacking knowledge, and hence high epistemic uncertainty.*




“epistemology” = study of knowledge and understanding

Domains, variables and opinions

Binary domain $\mathbb{X} = \{x, \bar{x}\}$

Binary variable $X = x$


Binomial opinion



3-ary domain \mathbb{X}

Random variable $X \in \mathbb{X}$


Multinomial opinion



Hyperdomain $\mathcal{R}(\mathbb{X})$


Hypervariable $X \in \mathcal{R}(\mathbb{X})$










Hypernomial opinion



Hyperdomains


- A domain X is a state space of distinct state values
- Powerset $\mathcal{P}(X) = 2^X$, set of subsets, including $\{X, \emptyset\}$
- Reduced powerset $\mathcal{R}(X) = \mathcal{P}(X) \setminus \{X, \emptyset\}$
- Hyperdomain $\mathcal{R}(X) = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6\}$
- $\mathcal{C}(X)$ called Composite set
- $\mathcal{C}(X) = \{x_4, x_5, x_6\}$
- Cardinalities:
 - $|X| = 3$ in this example
 - $|\mathcal{P}(X)| = 2^{|X|} = 8$ in this example
 - $|\mathcal{R}(X)| = 2^{|X|} - 2 = 6$ in this example



| | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Domain | <u>Binomial Opinion</u> Binary domain \mathbb{X} Binary variable $X = x$  | <u>Multinomial Opinion</u> n-ary domain \mathbb{X} Random variable $X \in \mathbb{X}$  | <u>Hypernomial Opinion</u> hyperdomain $\mathcal{R}(\mathbb{X})$ Hypervariable $X \in \mathcal{R}(\mathbb{X})$  |
| Geometric opinion representation |  triangle |  tetrahedron |  belief mosaic |
| PDF representation | Beta PDF over x  <small>FIG 1: Beta function after 7 positive and 1 negative results</small> | Dirichlet PDF over \mathbb{X}  | Hyper Dirichlet over \mathbb{X}  |

Binomial subjective opinions

- Belief mass and base rate on binary domain
 - $b_x^A = b(x)$ is source A 's belief in x
 - $d_x^A = b(\bar{x})$ is source A 's disbelief in x
 - $u_x^A = b(X)$ is source A 's epistemic uncertainty about x
 - a_x^A is the base rate of x




Base rates (also called Priors)

- In probability theory and statistics, a **base rate** refers to **category probability** unconditioned on evidence.
- “**Prior probability**” is the same as “**base rate**”.
- For example, if it were the case that 0.01% of persons in a population have tuberculosis, then the base rate of tuberculosis is 0.01%.
- Given a positive or negative result of a medical test, the posterior probability can be calculated by taking into account the base rate.


Barycentric representation of binomial opinions

- Ordered quadruple:
 $\omega_x = (b_x, d_x, u_x, a_x)$
 - b_x : belief
 - d_x : disbelief
 - u_x : epistemic uncertainty (lack of evidence)
 - a_x : base rate
- Point defined by additivity:
 $b_x + d_x + u_x = 1$
- Projected probability: $P(x) = b_x + a_x \cdot u_x$




Example $\omega_x = (0.4, 0.2, 0.4, 0.9)$, $P(x) = 0.76$


Opinion types




Absolute opinion: $b_x=1$. Equivalent to TRUE.
Low aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty.



Dogmatic opinion: $u_x=0$. Equivalent to probabilities.
Low epistemic uncertainty.



Vacuous opinion: $u_x=1$. Equivalent to UNDEFINED.
High epistemic uncertainty.



General uncertain opinion: $u_x \neq 0$.

Beta PDF representation

$$\text{Beta}(p(x); \alpha, \beta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} p(x)^{\alpha-1} (1 - p(x))^{\beta-1}$$

$$\alpha = r + W a$$

$$\beta = s + W(1-a)$$

r : # observations of x

s : # observations of \bar{x}


a : base rate of x

$W = 2$: non-informative
prior weight

$E(x)$: Expected probability

$$E(x) = P(x)$$

Beta Probability Density Function



Example: $r = 2$, $s = 1$, $a = 0.9$, $E(x) = 0.76$

Binomial Opinion \leftrightarrow Beta PDF

- (r,s,a) represents Beta PDF evidence parameters.
- (b,d,u,a) represents binomial opinion.
- $P(x) = E(x)$

- Op \rightarrow Beta:
$$\begin{cases} r = Wb / u \\ s = Wd / u \\ b + d + u = 1 \end{cases}$$





FIG 1: Beta function after 7 positive and 1 negative results

- Beta \rightarrow Op:
$$\begin{cases} b = \frac{r}{r+s+W} \\ d = \frac{s}{r+s+W} \\ u = \frac{W}{r+s+W} \end{cases}$$

$$W = 2$$






FIG 1: Beta function after 7 positive and 1 negative results



Online demo of opinion visualisation




<https://folk.universitetetioslo.no/josang/sl/BV.html>

Likelihood and Confidence


| Likelihood (probability) levels: | | Absolutely not | Very unlikely | Unlikely | Somewhat unlikely | Chances about even | Somewhat likely | Likely | Very likely | Absolutely |
|----------------------------------|----------|----------------|---------------|----------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------|-------------|------------|
| | | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Confidence (certainty) levels: | | | | | | | | | | |
| No confidence | E | 9E | 8E | 7E | 6E | 5E | 4E | 3E | 2E | 1E |
| Low confidence | D | 9D | 8D | 7D | 6D | 5D | 4D | 3D | 2D | 1D |
| Some confidence | C | 9C | 8C | 7C | 6C | 5C | 4C | 3C | 2C | 1C |
| High confidence | B | 9B | 8B | 7B | 6B | 5B | 4B | 3B | 2B | 1B |
| Total confidence | A | 9A | 8A | 7A | 6A | 5A | 4A | 3A | 2A | 1A |

Mapping qualitative to opinion

- Categories mapped to corresponding field of triangle
- Mapping depends on base rate
- Non-existent categories depending on base-rates



base rate $a = 1/3$




base rate $a = 2/3$

Mapping qualitative to opinions

- Overlay qualitative matrix with opinion triangle
- Matrix becomes skewed as a function of base rate
- Not all qualitative combinations map to opinions
 - For a base rate $a = 1/3$, it is impossible to describe an event as likely with low confidence (3D), but possible to describe it as unlikely with low confidence (7D).
 - E.g. with regard to tuberculosis which has a very low base rate, it would be irrational to say that a patient is likely to be infected, with low confidence (high uncertainty). However, it would be rational to say that a patient is unlikely to be infected, with low confidence (high uncertainty).

Multinomial domains

- Generalisation of binary domains
- Set of exclusive and exhaustive singletons.
- Example ternary domain: $\mathbb{X} = \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$, $|\mathbb{X}| = 3$.





Multinomial Opinions

- Domain: $\mathbb{X} = \{x_1 \dots x_k\}$
- Random variable $X \in \mathbb{X}$
- Multinomial opinion: $\omega_X = (b_X, u_X, a_X)$
- Belief mass distribution b_X where $u + \sum b_X(x) = 1$
 $b_X(x)$ is belief mass on $x \in \mathbb{X}$
- Epistemic uncertainty mass: u_X is a single value in range $[0,1]$
- Base rate distribution a_X where $\sum a_X(x) = 1$
 $a_X(x)$ is base rate of $x \in \mathbb{X}$
- Projected probability: $P_X(x) = b_X(x) + a_X(x) \cdot u_X$

Opinion tetrahedron (ternary domain)

Multinomial opinion: $\omega_X = (\mathbf{b}_X, u_X, \mathbf{a}_X)$

Belief masses

$$\mathbf{b}_X = \{\mathbf{b}_X(x_1), \mathbf{b}_X(x_2), \mathbf{b}_X(x_3)\}$$


Dirichlet PDF representation

$$\text{Dir}(p_X) = \frac{\Gamma\left(\sum_{i=1}^k \alpha_X(x_i)\right)}{\prod_{i=1}^k \Gamma(\alpha_X(x_i))} \prod_{i=1}^k p_X(x_i)^{\alpha_X(x_i)-1}$$

$$\sum p_X(x_i) = 1$$

$$\alpha_X(x_i) = r_X(x_i) + W \cdot a_X(x_i)$$

$r_X(x_i)$: # observations of x_i


$a_X(x_i)$: base rate of x_i

E_X : Expected proba. distr.

$$E_X = P_X$$

Example:


- 6 red balls
- 1 yellow ball
- 1 black ball



Multinomial Opinion \leftrightarrow Dirichlet PDF


- Dirichlet PDF evidence parameters: (r_X, a_X)
- Multinomial opinion parameters: (b_X, u_X, a_X)

- Op \rightarrow Dir:
$$\begin{cases} r_X(x) = \frac{W \cdot b_X(x)}{u_X} \\ u_X + \sum b_X(x) = 1 \end{cases}$$



$W = 2$

- Dir \rightarrow Op:
$$\begin{cases} b_X(x) = \frac{r_X(x)}{W + \sum r_X(x)} \\ u_X = \frac{W}{W + \sum r_X(x)} \end{cases}$$



Non-informative prior weight: W

- The prior Dirichlet PDF is assumed to be uniform, requiring that W is equal to the frame cardinality k .
- However, for arbitrarily large domains, W would become equally large, making the Dirichlet PDF insensitive to new observations, which would be an inadequate model.
- Solution: dynamic non-informative prior weight, where initially $W=k$, and where W converges to convergence constant C_W .

$$W = \frac{k + C_W k \sum r_X(x)}{1 + k \sum r_X(x)}$$

- It is normally assumed that the Beta PDF has the appropriate sensitivity to new observations, which dictates $C_W = 2$.

Prior trinomial Dirichlet PDF, $W = 3$

Example:

Urn with balls of 3 different colors.


- t_1 : Red
- t_2 : Yellow
- t_3 : Black

Cardinality: $k = 3$

No balls have been picket.

Non-informative prior weight: $W = k = 3$

Uniform *prior* probability density.



Posterior trinomial Dirichlet PDF

A posteriori probability density after picking:


1 red ball (t_1)

1 yellow ball (t_2)

1 black ball (t_3)

Dynamic non-informative prior weight:

$$W = \frac{k + 2k \sum r_X(x)}{1 + k \sum r_X(x)} = \frac{21}{10} = 2.1$$




Posterior trinomial Dirichlet PDF

A posteriori probability density after picking:

- 6 red balls (t_1)
- 1 yellow ball (t_2)
- 1 black ball (t_3)

- $W = 2.04$




Posterior trinomial Dirichlet PDF

A posteriori probability density
after picking:

- 20 red balls (t_1)
- 20 yellow balls (t_2)
- 20 black balls (t_3)

- $W = 2$




Posterior trinomial Dirichlet PDF

A posteriori probability density
after picking:

- 20 red balls (t_1)
- 20 yellow balls (t_2)
- 50 black balls (t_3)


- $W = 2$




Hyper-Opinions

- Domain: $X = \{x_1 \dots x_k\}$
- $\mathcal{P}(X)$ is the powerset of X
- Hyperdomain $\mathcal{R}(X) = \mathcal{P}(X) \setminus \{X, \emptyset\}$
- $\mathcal{R}(X)$ is the reduced powerset of X
- Hypervariable: $X \in \mathcal{R}(X)$
- Hyper opinion: $\omega_X = (b_X, u_X, a_X)$
- Belief mass distribution: b_X where $u_X + \sum_{x \in \mathcal{R}(X)} b_X(x) = 1$
 $b_X(x)$ is belief mass on $x \in \mathcal{R}(X)$
- Base rate distribution: a_X where $\sum_{x \in X} a_X(x) = 1$
 $a_X(x)$ is base rate of $x \in X$
- Projected probability: $P_X(x) = a_X(x) \cdot u_X + \sum_{x_j \in \mathcal{R}(X)} a_X(x | x_j) \cdot b_X(x_j)$

Hyper Opinions and Hyper Dirichlet PDF



Opinions v. Fuzzy membership functions



Subjective Logic Operators




Subjective logic operators 1

| Opinion operator name | Opinion operator symbol | Logic operator symbol | Logic operator name |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Addition | + | \cup | UNION |
| Subtraction | - | \setminus | DIFFERENCE |
| Complement | \neg | \overline{x} | NOT |
| Projected probability | $P(x)$ | n.a. | n.a. |
| Multiplication | . | \wedge | AND |
| Division | / | $\overline{\wedge}$ | UN-AND |
| Comultiplication | \sqcup | \vee | OR |
| Codivision | $\overline{\sqcup}$ | $\overline{\vee}$ | UN-OR |

Subjective logic operators 2

| Opinion operator name | Opinion operator symbol | Logic operator symbol | Logic operator name |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| Transitive discounting | \otimes | : | TRANSITIVITY |
| Cumulative fusion | \oplus | \diamond | n.a. |
| Averaging fusion | $\underline{\oplus}$ | $\underline{\diamond}$ | n.a. |
| Constraint fusion | \odot | & | n.a. |
| Inversion, Bayes' theorem | $\tilde{\phi}$ | $\tilde{\mid}$ | CONTRAPOSITION |
| Conditional deduction | \odot | \parallel | DEDUCTION (Modus Ponens) |
| Conditional abduction | $\tilde{\odot}$ | $\tilde{\parallel}$ | ABDUCTION (Modus Tollens) |


Belief Fusion



- Notation: $\omega_X^{\diamond(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N)} = \omega_X^{C_1} \oplus \omega_X^{C_2} \oplus \dots \omega_X^{C_N}$

Example: Reaching a verdict

- J_1, J_2, \dots, J_N are N different jury members.
- “guilty” is a binary statement.
- $[J_1, J_2, \dots, J_N]$ denotes the whole jury.
- ω_{BRD} is a politically defined threshold value for “*Beyond Reasonable Doubt*”.




Criterion for guilty conviction: $\omega_{\text{"guilty"}}^{\Diamond(J_1, J_2, \dots, J_N)} > \omega_{\text{BRD}} ?$


Subjective Trust Networks



Trust transitivity




Functional trust derivation requirement



- Functional trust derivation through transitive paths requires that the last trust edge represents functional trust (or an opinion) and that all previous trust edges represent referral trust.
- Functional trust can be an opinion about a variable.

Trust transitivity characteristics

Trust is diluted in a transitive chain.




Computed with discounting/transitivity operator of SL

Graph notation: $[A, E] = [A; B] : [B; C] : [C, E]$

SL notation: $\omega_E^{(A;B;C)} = \omega_B^A \otimes \omega_C^B \otimes \omega_E^C$

Trust Fusion


Combination of serial and parallel trust paths



Graph notation: $[A, E] = (([A;B] : [B;D]) \diamond ([A;C] : [C;D])) : [D,E]$

SL notation: $\omega_E^{[A;B;D] \diamond [A;C;D]} = ((\omega_B^A \otimes \omega_D^B) \oplus (\omega_C^A \otimes \omega_D^C)) \otimes \omega_E^D$


Discount and Fuse: Dilution and Confidence



Discounting dilutes trust confidence

Fusion strengthens trust confidence

Incorrect trust / belief derivation




Perceived: $([A, B] : [B, X]) \diamond ([A, C] : [C, X])$


Hidden: $([A, B] : [B, D] : [D, X]) \diamond ([A, C] : [C, D] : [D, X])$

Hidden and perceived topologies

Perceived topology:



Hidden topology:




$$([A, B] : [B, X]) \diamond ([A, C] : [C, X])$$

$$\neq ([A, B] : [B, D] : [D, X]) \diamond ([A, C] : [C, D] : [D, X])$$

(D, E) is taken into account twice


Correct trust / belief derivation



Perceived and real
topologies are equal:


$$(([A; B] : [B; D]) \diamond ([A; C] : [C; D])) : [D, X]$$

Computing discounted trust




Example: Weighing testimonies

- Computing beliefs about statements in court.
- J is the judge.
- W_1, W_2, W_3 are witnesses providing testimonies.
- X is a statement



Judge's opinion about statement: $\omega_X^{(J;W_1) \diamond (J;W_2) \diamond (J;W_3)}$

Computational trust with subjective logic




<https://folk.universitetetioslo.no/josang/sl/TN.html>

Bayesian Reasoning



Bayes' Theorem



Bayes' Theorem

- Traditional statement of Bayes' theorem:

$$p(x | y) = \frac{p(y|x)p(x)}{p(y)}$$

- Bayes' theorem with explicit base rates:

$$p(x | y) = \frac{p(y|x)a(x)}{a(y)}$$

- Marginal base rates:

$$a(y) = p(y | x)a(x) + p(y | \bar{x})a(\bar{x})$$

- Bayes' theorem with marginal base rates

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} p(x | y) = \frac{p(y|x)a(x)}{p(y|x)a(x) + p(y|\bar{x})a(\bar{x})} \\ p(x | \bar{y}) = \frac{p(\bar{y}|x)a(x)}{p(\bar{y}|x)a(x) + p(\bar{y}|\bar{x})a(\bar{x})} \end{array} \right.$$

The Subjective Bayes' Theorem


Inversion of conditional opinions

Binomial: $(\omega_{x|\tilde{y}}, \omega_{x|\tilde{\bar{y}}}) = \tilde{\phi}(\omega_{y|x}, \omega_{y|\bar{x}}, a_x)$


Multinomial: $\omega_{X|\tilde{Y}} = \tilde{\phi}(\omega_{Y|X}, a_X)$

Visualising inversion of conditionals

(Subjective Bayes' theorem)




Subjective Bayes' Theorem and Uncertainty




- Figure shows effect of repeated conditional inversion with the subjective Bayes' theorem
- Uncertainty increases and converges to uncertainty-maximised conditional opinions

Bayes' theorem – online operator demo




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Deduction and Abduction




Deduction and abduction notation



$$\omega_{Y||X} = \omega_{Y|X} \odot \omega_X$$

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{X\tilde{||}Y} &= (\omega_{Y|X}, \mathbf{a}_X) \tilde{\odot} \omega_Y \\ &= \tilde{\Phi}(\omega_{Y|X}, \mathbf{a}_X) \odot \omega_Y \\ &= \omega_{X\tilde{|}Y} \odot \omega_Y \end{aligned}$$



Example: Medical reasoning


- Medical test reliability determined by:
 - true positive rate $p(y | x)$ where x : infected
 - false positive rate $p(y | \bar{x})$ y : positive test
- Bayes' theorem: $p(x | y) = \frac{p(y | x)p(x)}{p(y)} = \frac{p(y | x)a(x)}{p(y | x)a(x) + p(y | \bar{x})a(\bar{x})}$
- Probabilistic model hides uncertainty
- Use subjective Bayes' theorem to determine $\omega_{(\text{infected})}$

$$\omega_{X \upharpoonright Y} = \wp (\omega_{Y|X}, \mathbf{a}_X)$$


- GP derives $\omega_{(\text{infected} \upharpoonright \text{positive})}$ and $\omega_{(\text{infected} \upharpoonright \text{negative})}$
- Finally compute diagnosis $\omega_{(\text{infected} \upharpoonright \text{test result})}$
- Medical reasoning with SL reflects uncertainty

Deduction visualisation

- Evidence pyramid is mapped inside hypothesis pyramid as a function of the conditionals.
- Conclusion opinion is linearly mapped




Deduction – online operator demo




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Abduction – Online operator demo




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The General Idea of Subjective Networks



Subjective Networks




Legend:

A: Analyst;
B, C, D, E: Sources;
X, Y, Z: Variables;



- - - - -> Trust;
 —————> Belief;
 ●=====> Conditional dependence.

Example Subjective Network Model



$$\omega_Z^A = \omega_{Z|Y}^A \odot (\omega_{Y|X}^A \odot ((\omega_B^A \otimes \omega_X^B) \oplus (\omega_C^A \otimes \omega_X^C)))$$

Trust and Uncertainty in AI




Classification expressed
as subjective opinion

MUDL:

Multidimensional Uncertainty-Aware Deep Learning Framework

- Research project during 2021-2025
- Coordinated by Virginia Tech USA
- Collaboration with
 - University of Texas at Dallas
 - US Army Research Lab
 - University of Oslo



- Funded by NSF




National Science Foundation
WHERE DISCOVERIES BEGIN

Book on Subjective Logic



springer.com



A. Jøsang

Subjective Logic

A Formalism for Reasoning Under Uncertainty

Series: Artificial Intelligence: Foundations, Theory, and Algorithms

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- ▶ **First comprehensive treatment of subjective logic and its operations, by the researcher who developed the approach**
- ▶ **Helpful for researchers and practitioners who want to build artificial reasoning models and tools for solving real-world problems**

This is the first comprehensive treatment of subjective logic and all its operations. The author developed the approach, and in this book he first explains subjective opinions,