

How small wars become big(er) wars:
latent dynamics of conflict and the role of peacekeeping



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
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Introduction and summary

Preliminary models, ideas and some results for some **statistical models for the intensity and escalation** in wars and violent conflicts.



What is intensity and what is escalation?

- 1) Current state on conflict (and escalation) research
- 2) Why a latent model?
- 3) A class of statistical model for intensity and escalation in war and violent conflicts
- 4) Properties, simulations and simple illustrations
- 5) A dynamic data-dependent prior framework
- 6) Illustration with covariates (PKO)

The current understanding of war and conflict escalation

Conflict research has spent the last 20 years doing systematic, largely statistical, studies to understand:

- why civil wars break out
- how they are sustained and
- when and how durable post-conflict peace is possible

Much less energy has been spent understanding **the dynamics of conflict**, i.e. the underlying intensity and escalation process(es).


The main goals are to understand why and when

- non-violent conflicts become violent
- **when low intensity conflict becomes high intensity**

The state-of-the-art aim at modelling the **differences between smaller and bigger wars**, typically relying on off-the-shelf tools (e.g. markov models).

We also intend to investigate and **build (new) statistical models** with focus on good representation of the underlying intensity and escalation process.

Why a latent model?



Let y_t be the number of battle deaths and consider the general (toy) model

$$y_t | \theta_t \sim f(y_t | \theta_t)$$
$$\theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi \sim \pi(\theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi),$$

with θ_t as a latent process that depend on the previous observation y_{t-1} .

We will think of the **latent θ_t as the intensity**, which can be modelled as:

- states (e.g. hidden markov model)
- smooth functions or
- **stochastic**

A Poisson-Gamma model for the intensity

Let y_t be the number of battle deaths at time t and consider the model

$$y_t | \theta_t \sim \text{Poisson}(\theta_t)$$
$$\theta_t | y_{t-1}, a, b, c \sim \text{Gamma}(c(a + by_{t-1}), c)$$

where $a > 0$, $c > 0$ and $0 < b < 1$.

We need $|b| < 1$ to ensure that y_t has a finite expectation as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

For this model, we may view

- a as baseline intensity
- b as a type of escalation parameter and
- c as the rate/chance of battle death(s) (i.e. $y_t > 0$)


Why not

$$\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}, a, b, c \sim \text{Gamma}(c(a + b\theta_{t-1}), c)$$

or

$$\theta_t | y_{t-1}, a, b, c \sim \text{Gamma}(ce^{a+by_{t-1}}, c)$$

Yes, it is an extremely simplified model




Clearly a **simplification of the dynamics** of real wars and violent conflicts.

It is a starting point and toy model we intend to expand by incorporating more complex (time or spatial) dynamics and covariates.

It is a simplification, the question is then whether it is sufficiently complex to enable **relevant inference**.

Simulations from the Poisson-Gamma model

Simulated 100 time steps from the from the Poisson-Gamma model with $a = 0.4$, $c = 0.1$ and $b = (0.0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9)$.



A negative binomial model for escalation

Furthermore, if we integrating out all the θ_t , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} f(y_2, \dots, y_n | y_1, a, b, c) &= \prod_{t=2}^n \frac{1}{y_t!} \frac{\Gamma(y_t + c(a + by_{t-1}))}{\Gamma(c(a + by_{t-1}))} \frac{c^{c(a+by_{t-1})}}{(c+1)^{y_t+c(a+by_{t-1})}} \\ &= \prod_{t=2}^n \text{NB}(y_t | r_t, p), \end{aligned}$$

where $r_t = c(a + by_{t-1})$ and $p = 1/(c + 1)$.

From this, it is clear that $y_t | y_{t-1}$ is **negative binomial** for $t > 1$, and from the properties of the negative binomial distribution we may think of

$$y_t = \epsilon_t + \sum_{i=0}^{y_{t-1}} \delta_i,$$

where ϵ_t and δ_i are independent and

$$\epsilon_t \sim \text{NB}(ca, p) \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_i \sim \text{NB}(cb, p),$$

which provides insight into the interpretation of parameters and also motivate some natural extensions.

A negative binomial model for escalation

From the above, it is clear that

$$E[y_t | y_{t-1}] = a + by_{t-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Var}(y_t | y_{t-1}) = (1 + 1/c)(a + by_{t-1}),$$

which give same/more insights into the interpretation of a , b and c .


For example, with $c \rightarrow \infty$ we get the **Poisson autoregressive model**.

Furthermore, it follows that for $0 < k < t$ we have that

$$E[y_t | y_{t-k}] = a \sum_{i=1}^k b^{i-1} + b^k y_{t-k},$$


which shows that $|b| < 1$ to guarantee a finite mean; similar insights from the conditional variance.

Illustration: Estimation and simulation (Congo)



Estimated parameters for Congo $(\hat{a}, \hat{b}, \hat{c}) = (25.95, 0.48, 0.0020)$.

Illustration: Estimation and simulation (Saudi Arabia)



Estimated parameters for Saudi Arabia $(\hat{a}, \hat{b}, \hat{c}) = (0.68, 0.80, 0.015)$.

A dynamic and data-dependent prior formulation

Consider the following hierarchical setup

$$\begin{aligned}y_t | \theta_t &\sim f(y_t | \theta_t) \\ \theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi &\sim \pi(\theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi) \\ \phi &\sim \pi(\phi)\end{aligned}$$

were we think of $\pi(\theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi)$ as a type of **dynamic data-dependent prior**, i.e. the prior for tomorrow depends on what we see today.

And if we let $f(y_t | \theta_t)$ be Poisson, and $\pi(\theta_t | y_{t-1}, \phi)$ be Gamma (with a suitable prior for ϕ) we have a similar modelling framework (as above).

Why?

- the political scientists often **have priors and generally like Bayes**
- the Bayesian framework may simplify certain parts related to inference

Posterior inference for Congo


To obtain a model similar to the above, let

$$y_t \mid \theta_t \sim \text{Poisson}(y_t \mid \theta_t)$$

$$\theta_t \mid y_{t-1}, a, b, c \sim \text{Gamma}(\theta_t \mid y_{t-1}, a, b, c)$$

and $a \sim \text{Gamma}(a_0, a_1)$, $b \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 1)$, $c \sim \text{Gamma}(c_0, c_1)$ we obtain via MCMC the following posteriors.

Then for Congo:



Posterior inference for Saudi Arabia


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And for Saudi Arabia:



Conflict escalation and UN peacekeeping (PKO)

There are many possible choices of covariates in the political science literature.

Here, as an illustration, we consider **UN peacekeeping** (PKO), and the potential effect on the processes of escalation.

There are four types of PKOs mandates:

- type 1 is essentially a guy with binoculars on a hill
- type 2 is two guys with binoculars on a hill
- **type 3 is armed forces**
- **type 4 is active and heavily armed forces**

In general, there is a lack systematic understanding of how PKOs affect the conflict process.

Several potential problems, such as endogeneity, omitted variables, etc.

Illustration: Battle deaths and the effect of PKOs in Congo

Now, to include covariates, let

$$b(x_t, \beta) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x_t^t \beta}}$$

with $\beta = (\beta_0, \beta_{\text{PKO}})$ and $x_t = (1, x_{t,1})$ with

$$x_{t,1} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if PKO mandate is of type 3 or 4 in year } t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

