The increasing interconnection of industrial control systems (ICS) with corporate networks and the internet has exposed critical infrastructures such as gas installations to sophisticated cyber threats. Past incidents, including the Stuxnet worm, the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco, and the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, have demonstrated how cyber intrusions can disrupt energy supply chains, compromise safety, and cause severe economic and societal impacts. These events highlight not only the technical vulnerabilities in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems but also the strategic interest of state and non-state actors in targeting energy infrastructures for political or financial gain. The gas sector, with its heavy reliance on distributed monitoring and automated control, presents a high-value target where the consequences of successful attacks can extend from operational downtime to environmental hazards.
This thesis focuses on analyzing potential cyber attack vectors against gas installations and evaluating their implications for both operational continuity and security. By combining case study analysis of historical incidents with simulation-based threat modeling, the research aims to identify critical system weaknesses and propose defensive measures tailored to the gas industry’s unique requirements.
The thesis is supervised together with the Norwegian Defense Cyber Academy. Due to regulatory and project-specific requirements, applicants holding citizenship from certain countries are regrettably not eligible for this thesis topic.